diff --git a/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch b/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c98ed748c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libexif/0001-fixes-some-not-all-buffer-overreads-during-decoding-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From 41bd04234b104312f54d25822f68738ba8d7133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marcus Meissner +Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:44:44 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fixes some (not all) buffer overreads during decoding pentax + makernote entries. + +This should fix: +https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/125/ CVE-2016-6328 + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c +index d03d159..ea0429a 100644 +--- a/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c ++++ b/libexif/pentax/mnote-pentax-entry.c +@@ -425,24 +425,34 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry, + case EXIF_FORMAT_SHORT: + { + const unsigned char *data = entry->data; +- size_t k, len = strlen(val); ++ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft; ++ ++ sizeleft = entry->size; + for(k=0; kcomponents; k++) { ++ if (sizeleft < 2) ++ break; + vs = exif_get_short (data, entry->order); + snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%i ", vs); + len = strlen(val); + data += 2; ++ sizeleft -= 2; + } + } + break; + case EXIF_FORMAT_LONG: + { + const unsigned char *data = entry->data; +- size_t k, len = strlen(val); ++ size_t k, len = strlen(val), sizeleft; ++ ++ sizeleft = entry->size; + for(k=0; kcomponents; k++) { ++ if (sizeleft < 4) ++ break; + vl = exif_get_long (data, entry->order); + snprintf (val+len, maxlen-len, "%li", (long int) vl); + len = strlen(val); + data += 4; ++ sizeleft -= 4; + } + } + break; +@@ -455,5 +465,5 @@ mnote_pentax_entry_get_value (MnotePentaxEntry *entry, + break; + } + +- return (val); ++ return val; + } +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch b/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..84c92593bc --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libexif/0002-On-saving-makernotes-make-sure-the-makernote-contain.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From c39acd1692023b26290778a02a9232c873f9d71a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marcus Meissner +Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2017 23:38:56 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] On saving makernotes, make sure the makernote container tags + has a type with 1 byte components. + +Fixes (at least): + https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/130 + https://sourceforge.net/p/libexif/bugs/129 + +CVE-2017-7544: libexif through 0.6.21 is vulnerable to out-of-bounds heap +read vulnerability in exif_data_save_data_entry function in +libexif/exif-data.c caused by improper length computation of the allocated +data of an ExifMnote entry which can cause denial-of-service or possibly +information disclosure. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + libexif/exif-data.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c +index 67df4db..91f4c33 100644 +--- a/libexif/exif-data.c ++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c +@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ exif_data_save_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *e, + exif_mnote_data_set_offset (data->priv->md, *ds - 6); + exif_mnote_data_save (data->priv->md, &e->data, &e->size); + e->components = e->size; ++ if (exif_format_get_size (e->format) != 1) { ++ /* e->format is taken from input code, ++ * but we need to make sure it is a 1 byte ++ * entity due to the multiplication below. */ ++ e->format = EXIF_FORMAT_UNDEFINED; ++ } + } + } + +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch b/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e662d6bfc9 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libexif/0003-Reduce-maximum-recursion-depth-in-exif_data_load_dat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From 5d28011c40ec86cf52cffad541093d37c263898a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dan Fandrich +Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2018 18:05:19 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Reduce maximum recursion depth in exif_data_load_data_content + +This only needs to be a small, single digit integer for normal files, +and reducing the maximum closer to this reduces the time and space +needed to detect pathological cases. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + libexif/exif-data.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c +index 91f4c33..04cdda2 100644 +--- a/libexif/exif-data.c ++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c +@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, + if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT)) + return; + +- if (recursion_depth > 30) { ++ if (recursion_depth > 12) { + exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData", + "Deep recursion detected!"); + return; +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch b/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ff991541fe --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libexif/0004-Improve-deep-recursion-detection-in-exif_data_load_d.patch @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +From 6aa11df549114ebda520dde4cdaea2f9357b2c89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dan Fandrich +Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2018 16:01:45 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Improve deep recursion detection in + exif_data_load_data_content. + +The existing detection was still vulnerable to pathological cases +causing DoS by wasting CPU. The new algorithm takes the number of tags +into account to make it harder to abuse by cases using shallow recursion +but with a very large number of tags. This improves on commit 5d28011c +which wasn't sufficient to counter this kind of case. + +The limitation in the previous fix was discovered by Laurent Delosieres, +Secunia Research at Flexera (Secunia Advisory SA84652) and is assigned +the identifier CVE-2018-20030. + +[Peter: drop NEWS change] +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + libexif/exif-data.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c +index e35403d..a6f9c94 100644 +--- a/libexif/exif-data.c ++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + #include + #include + ++#include + #include + #include + #include +@@ -350,6 +351,20 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ + break; \ + } + ++/*! Calculate the recursion cost added by one level of IFD loading. ++ * ++ * The work performed is related to the cost in the exponential relation ++ * work=1.1**cost ++ */ ++static unsigned int ++level_cost(unsigned int n) ++{ ++ static const double log_1_1 = 0.09531017980432493; ++ ++ /* Adding 0.1 protects against the case where n==1 */ ++ return ceil(log(n + 0.1)/log_1_1); ++} ++ + /*! Load data for an IFD. + * + * \param[in,out] data #ExifData +@@ -357,13 +372,13 @@ if (data->ifd[(i)]->count) { \ + * \param[in] d pointer to buffer containing raw IFD data + * \param[in] ds size of raw data in buffer at \c d + * \param[in] offset offset into buffer at \c d at which IFD starts +- * \param[in] recursion_depth number of times this function has been +- * recursively called without returning ++ * \param[in] recursion_cost factor indicating how expensive this recursive ++ * call could be + */ + static void + exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, + const unsigned char *d, +- unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_depth) ++ unsigned int ds, unsigned int offset, unsigned int recursion_cost) + { + ExifLong o, thumbnail_offset = 0, thumbnail_length = 0; + ExifShort n; +@@ -378,9 +393,20 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, + if ((((int)ifd) < 0) || ( ((int)ifd) >= EXIF_IFD_COUNT)) + return; + +- if (recursion_depth > 12) { ++ if (recursion_cost > 170) { ++ /* ++ * recursion_cost is a logarithmic-scale indicator of how expensive this ++ * recursive call might end up being. It is an indicator of the depth of ++ * recursion as well as the potential for worst-case future recursive ++ * calls. Since it's difficult to tell ahead of time how often recursion ++ * will occur, this assumes the worst by assuming every tag could end up ++ * causing recursion. ++ * The value of 170 was chosen to limit typical EXIF structures to a ++ * recursive depth of about 6, but pathological ones (those with very ++ * many tags) to only 2. ++ */ + exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, "ExifData", +- "Deep recursion detected!"); ++ "Deep/expensive recursion detected!"); + return; + } + +@@ -422,15 +448,18 @@ exif_data_load_data_content (ExifData *data, ExifIfd ifd, + switch (tag) { + case EXIF_TAG_EXIF_IFD_POINTER: + CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_EXIF); +- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); ++ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_EXIF, d, ds, o, ++ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); + break; + case EXIF_TAG_GPS_INFO_IFD_POINTER: + CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_GPS); +- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); ++ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_GPS, d, ds, o, ++ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); + break; + case EXIF_TAG_INTEROPERABILITY_IFD_POINTER: + CHECK_REC (EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY); +- exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, recursion_depth + 1); ++ exif_data_load_data_content (data, EXIF_IFD_INTEROPERABILITY, d, ds, o, ++ recursion_cost + level_cost(n)); + break; + case EXIF_TAG_JPEG_INTERCHANGE_FORMAT: + thumbnail_offset = o; +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch b/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f708b2ae54 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/libexif/0005-fix-CVE-2019-9278.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From 75aa73267fdb1e0ebfbc00369e7312bac43d0566 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marcus Meissner +Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 09:29:42 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2019-9278 + +avoid the use of unsafe integer overflow checking constructs (unsigned integer operations cannot overflow, so "u1 + u2 > u1" can be optimized away) + +check for the actual sizes, which should also handle the overflows +document other places google patched, but do not seem relevant due to other restrictions + +fixes https://github.com/libexif/libexif/issues/26 + +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard +--- + libexif/exif-data.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libexif/exif-data.c b/libexif/exif-data.c +index a6f9c94..6332cd1 100644 +--- a/libexif/exif-data.c ++++ b/libexif/exif-data.c +@@ -192,9 +192,15 @@ exif_data_load_data_entry (ExifData *data, ExifEntry *entry, + doff = offset + 8; + + /* Sanity checks */ +- if ((doff + s < doff) || (doff + s < s) || (doff + s > size)) { ++ if (doff >= size) { + exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", +- "Tag data past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size); ++ "Tag starts past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff, size); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ if (s > size - doff) { ++ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", ++ "Tag data goes past end of buffer (%u > %u)", doff+s, size); + return 0; + } + +@@ -315,13 +321,14 @@ exif_data_load_data_thumbnail (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d, + unsigned int ds, ExifLong o, ExifLong s) + { + /* Sanity checks */ +- if ((o + s < o) || (o + s < s) || (o + s > ds) || (o > ds)) { +- exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", +- "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u) or size (%u).", +- o, s); ++ if (o >= ds) { ++ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail offset (%u).", o); ++ return; ++ } ++ if (s > ds - o) { ++ exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", "Bogus thumbnail size (%u), max would be %u.", s, ds-o); + return; + } +- + if (data->data) + exif_mem_free (data->priv->mem, data->data); + if (!(data->data = exif_data_alloc (data, s))) { +@@ -947,7 +954,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, + exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", + "IFD 0 at %i.", (int) offset); + +- /* Sanity check the offset, being careful about overflow */ ++ /* ds is restricted to 16 bit above, so offset is restricted too, and offset+8 should not overflow. */ + if (offset > ds || offset + 6 + 2 > ds) + return; + +@@ -956,6 +963,7 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, + + /* IFD 1 offset */ + n = exif_get_short (d + 6 + offset, data->priv->order); ++ /* offset < 2<<16, n is 16 bit at most, so this op will not overflow */ + if (offset + 6 + 2 + 12 * n + 4 > ds) + return; + +@@ -964,8 +972,8 @@ exif_data_load_data (ExifData *data, const unsigned char *d_orig, + exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_DEBUG, "ExifData", + "IFD 1 at %i.", (int) offset); + +- /* Sanity check. */ +- if (offset > ds || offset + 6 > ds) { ++ /* Sanity check. ds is ensured to be above 6 above, offset is 16bit */ ++ if (offset > ds - 6) { + exif_log (data->priv->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, + "ExifData", "Bogus offset of IFD1."); + } else { +-- +2.20.1 +