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package/systemd: add upstream fix for CVE-2018-16865

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Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
This commit is contained in:
James Hilliard 2019-01-13 20:01:10 +08:00 committed by Peter Korsgaard
parent 1d7031b31e
commit f4d3d62b10
3 changed files with 250 additions and 0 deletions
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57
package/systemd/0010-journald-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-1k.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 22:45:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] journald: set a limit on the number of fields (1k)
We allocate a iovec entry for each field, so with many short entries,
our memory usage and processing time can be large, even with a relatively
small message size. Let's refuse overly long entries.
CVE-2018-16865
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861
What from I can see, the problem is not from an alloca, despite what the CVE
description says, but from the attack multiplication that comes from creating
many very small iovecs: (void* + size_t) for each three bytes of input message.
[james.hilliard1@gmail.com: backport from upstream commit
052c57f132f04a3cf4148f87561618da1a6908b4]
Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
---
src/journal/journald-native.c | 5 +++++
src/shared/journal-importer.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/journal/journald-native.c b/src/journal/journald-native.c
index e86178e..d0fee2a 100644
--- a/src/journal/journald-native.c
+++ b/src/journal/journald-native.c
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ static int server_process_entry(
}
/* A property follows */
+ if (n > ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) {
+ log_debug("Received an entry that has more than " STRINGIFY(ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX) " fields, ignoring entry.");
+ r = 1;
+ goto finish;
+ }
/* n existing properties, 1 new, +1 for _TRANSPORT */
if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovec, m,
diff --git a/src/shared/journal-importer.h b/src/shared/journal-importer.h
index 53354b7..7914c0c 100644
--- a/src/shared/journal-importer.h
+++ b/src/shared/journal-importer.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
#endif
#define LINE_CHUNK 8*1024u
+/* The maximum number of fields in an entry */
+#define ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX 1024
+
struct iovec_wrapper {
struct iovec *iovec;
size_t size_bytes;
--
2.7.4

112
package/systemd/0011-journal-remote-verify-entry-length-from-header.patch Normal file
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From 7fdb237f5473cb8fc2129e57e8a0039526dcb4fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 12:47:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] journal-remote: verify entry length from header
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Calling mhd_respond(), which ulimately calls MHD_queue_response() is
ineffective at point, becuase MHD_queue_response() immediately returns
MHD_NO signifying an error, because the connection is in state
MHD_CONNECTION_CONTINUE_SENT.
As Christian Grothoff kindly explained:
> You are likely calling MHD_queue_repsonse() too late: once you are
> receiving upload_data, HTTP forces you to process it all. At this time,
> MHD has already sent "100 continue" and cannot take it back (hence you
> get MHD_NO!).
>
> In your request handler, the first time when you are called for a
> connection (and when hence *upload_data_size == 0 and upload_data ==
> NULL) you must check the content-length header and react (with
> MHD_queue_response) based on this (to prevent MHD from automatically
> generating 100 continue).
If we ever encounter this kind of error, print a warning and immediately
abort the connection. (The alternative would be to keep reading the data,
but ignore it, and return an error after we get to the end of data.
That is possible, but of course puts additional load on both the
sender and reciever, and doesn't seem important enough just to return
a good error message.)
Note that sending of the error does not work (the connection is always aborted
when MHD_queue_response is used with MHD_RESPMEM_MUST_FREE, as in this case)
with libµhttpd 0.59, but works with 0.61:
https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/libmicrohttpd/pull-request/1
[james.hilliard1@gmail.com: backport from upstream commit
7fdb237f5473cb8fc2129e57e8a0039526dcb4fd]
Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
---
src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
index e1748cb..8543dba 100644
--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
@@ -221,16 +221,14 @@ static int process_http_upload(
journal_remote_server_global->seal);
if (r == -EAGAIN)
break;
- else if (r < 0) {
- log_warning("Failed to process data for connection %p", connection);
+ if (r < 0) {
if (r == -E2BIG)
- return mhd_respondf(connection,
- r, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
- "Entry is too large, maximum is " STRINGIFY(DATA_SIZE_MAX) " bytes.");
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Entry is too above maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
+ DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection);
else
- return mhd_respondf(connection,
- r, MHD_HTTP_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
- "Processing failed: %m.");
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to process data, aborting connection %p: %m",
+ connection);
+ return MHD_NO;
}
}
@@ -264,6 +262,7 @@ static int request_handler(
const char *header;
int r, code, fd;
_cleanup_free_ char *hostname = NULL;
+ size_t len;
assert(connection);
assert(connection_cls);
@@ -283,12 +282,27 @@ static int request_handler(
if (!streq(url, "/upload"))
return mhd_respond(connection, MHD_HTTP_NOT_FOUND, "Not found.");
- header = MHD_lookup_connection_value(connection,
- MHD_HEADER_KIND, "Content-Type");
+ header = MHD_lookup_connection_value(connection, MHD_HEADER_KIND, "Content-Type");
if (!header || !streq(header, "application/vnd.fdo.journal"))
return mhd_respond(connection, MHD_HTTP_UNSUPPORTED_MEDIA_TYPE,
"Content-Type: application/vnd.fdo.journal is required.");
+ header = MHD_lookup_connection_value(connection, MHD_HEADER_KIND, "Content-Length");
+ if (!header)
+ return mhd_respond(connection, MHD_HTTP_LENGTH_REQUIRED,
+ "Content-Length header is required.");
+ r = safe_atozu(header, &len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return mhd_respondf(connection, r, MHD_HTTP_LENGTH_REQUIRED,
+ "Content-Length: %s cannot be parsed: %m", header);
+
+ if (len > ENTRY_SIZE_MAX)
+ /* When serialized, an entry of maximum size might be slightly larger,
+ * so this does not correspond exactly to the limit in journald. Oh well.
+ */
+ return mhd_respondf(connection, 0, MHD_HTTP_PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE,
+ "Payload larger than maximum size of %u bytes", ENTRY_SIZE_MAX);
+
{
const union MHD_ConnectionInfo *ci;
--
2.7.4

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package/systemd/0012-journal-remote-set-a-limit-on-the-number-of-fields-i.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
From ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Fri, 7 Dec 2018 10:48:10 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] journal-remote: set a limit on the number of fields in a
message
Existing use of E2BIG is replaced with ENOBUFS (entry too long), and E2BIG is
reused for the new error condition (too many fields).
This matches the change done for systemd-journald, hence forming the second
part of the fix for CVE-2018-16865
(https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1653861).
[james.hilliard1@gmail.com: backport from upstream commit
ef4d6abe7c7fab6cbff975b32e76b09feee56074]
Signed-off-by: James Hilliard <james.hilliard1@gmail.com>
---
src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c | 7 +++++--
src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c | 3 +++
src/shared/journal-importer.c | 5 ++++-
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
index 8543dba..802c3ea 100644
--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
+++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote-main.c
@@ -222,9 +222,12 @@ static int process_http_upload(
if (r == -EAGAIN)
break;
if (r < 0) {
- if (r == -E2BIG)
- log_warning_errno(r, "Entry is too above maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
+ if (r == -ENOBUFS)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Entry is above the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
DATA_SIZE_MAX, connection);
+ else if (r == -E2BIG)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Entry with more fields than the maximum of %u, aborting connection %p.",
+ ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX, connection);
else
log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to process data, aborting connection %p: %m",
connection);
diff --git a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
index 3c0916c..1da32c5 100644
--- a/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
+++ b/src/journal-remote/journal-remote.c
@@ -407,6 +407,9 @@ int journal_remote_handle_raw_source(
log_debug("%zu active sources remaining", s->active);
return 0;
} else if (r == -E2BIG) {
+ log_notice("Entry with too many fields, skipped");
+ return 1;
+ } else if (r == -ENOBUFS) {
log_notice("Entry too big, skipped");
return 1;
} else if (r == -EAGAIN) {
diff --git a/src/shared/journal-importer.c b/src/shared/journal-importer.c
index b0e6192..8638cd3 100644
--- a/src/shared/journal-importer.c
+++ b/src/shared/journal-importer.c
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ enum {
};
static int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void* data, size_t len) {
+ if (iovw->count >= ENTRY_FIELD_COUNT_MAX)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(iovw->iovec, iovw->size_bytes, iovw->count + 1))
return log_oom();
@@ -97,7 +100,7 @@ static int get_line(JournalImporter *imp, char **line, size_t *size) {
imp->scanned = imp->filled;
if (imp->scanned >= DATA_SIZE_MAX)
- return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(E2BIG),
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOBUFS),
"Entry is bigger than %u bytes.",
DATA_SIZE_MAX);
--
2.7.4